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Christian Koller 
Military Colonialism in France and in the British Empire 
 
During the First World War more than 600,000 colonial soldiers including 270,000 
Maghrebians, 153,000 Indians and 134,000 West Africans fought in the ranks of the Entente 
Powers in the European theatre of war. The presence of non-Europeans in previously 
unknown numbers resulted in serious discussions in the countries having deployed these 
soldiers as well as in Germany. This article is intended to reveal the background of colonial 
policies in France and in the British Empire and to confront these discussions with the 
reactions of the German Empire. 
After war had broken out in August 1914, the French started conscripting troops from their 
colonies on a large scale. The first West African units were warmly welcomed when they set 
foot in France; the enthusiastic crowds greeted them with cheers like: "Bravo les tirailleurs 
sénégalais! Couper têtes aux allemands!" (Well done Senegalese tirailleurs! Decapitate the 
Germans!) However, during their first deployments the colonial troops suffered some 
catastrophic losses. This led some sections of the officer corps starting to question their 
military value. During the year 1915, however, General Charles Mangin, who had been 
strongly in favour of a strong "armée noire" (black army) just before the war, launched a 
campaign for further recruitments in Africa. The announced target figure was half a million 
soldiers from the colonies. The French press welcomed Mangin’s proposal with great 
enthusiasm, however, there was some scepticism in colonial political circles. To a certain 
extent the government took this criticism to heart. In the late autumn of 1915, it decided to 
extend recruitments in the colonies, but they did not meet the expectations of Mangin’s 
supporters. 
Initially, the image of the colonial soldiers with which Mangin had made propaganda for the 
extension of the “armée noire” in the pre-war period prevailed in public opinion, i.e. Africans 
are primitive and belligerent and are therefore ideally suited to be used as shock troops at the 
front in a European war. In February 1915 a caricature was published in the "Midi Colonial", 
a Marseille magazine, in which an Islamic soldier could be seen with a chain of cut off ears 
with the legend "Taisez-vous, méfiez-vous, les oreilles ennemies vous écoutent!" (Shut up, be 
careful, enemy ears are listening!). This image of colonial soldiers as bloodthirsty savages 
resulted in the local population being less than supportive of African troops spending the 
winter on the Côte d'Azur. Lucie Cousturier, who had got to know a number of injured 
"tirailleurs sénégalais" while she nursed them during and after the war at the military hospital 
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of Fréjus, wrote in her book in 1920 "Des Inconnus chez moi" about the mood among the 
civilian population: 
"In April–May 1916, we credited our future friends with many acts of horror. All the peasants 
indulged with us. There is no crime they were not accused of. After the devastation of the 
forest, the ugliness of their barracks, of their camps and of their hospitals, they were accused 
of drunkenness, theft, rape, and of causing epidemics. – “What is to become of us?” moaned 
the farmers’ wives, we will no longer be able to let our poultry run freely among these 
thieves, or dry our laundry on the hedges or let the fruit ripen on our trees. We will not dare 
let our young daughters walk the paths among these savages. We will not dare go out 
ourselves to cut the grass or gather wood. Just imagine! If we got caught by these gorillas." 
To pacify these fears among the population while simultaneously refuting the accusations 
propagated by German propaganda, another image of the Africans was conveyed by the 
authorities as from 1916.  They should no longer be seen as bloodthirsty savages but as big 
children, as descendents of "races jeunes" (young races), who due to their intellectual 
inferiority were fully dependent on their white masters. 
Still in 1916, colonial officer circles discussed how to resolve the ever-growing shortage of 
soldiers. The commander of the Somalian battalion said he was willing to recruit 6,000 
Somalis, 6,000 Yemenites and 12,000 Ethiopians to fight in Europe, a proposal that 
apparently was never given much serious consideration by the competent authorities. The ever 
growing supporters of an "armée jaune" (yellow army) were more successful. The deployment 
of Indochinese soldiers in Europe was indeed intensified during the second half of the war. 
In the course of 1917, the fate of the "armée noire" remained closely linked to General 
Mangin in person. On 16 April General Nivelle launched an offensive in Champagne, in 
which the Second Colonial Corps (to which 35 West African battalions belonged) under the 
command of General Mangin also participated. The German counteroffensive, launched the 
following day, entailed many losses: almost half of all the deployed West African soldiers 
died. Because of this Mangin, who shortly before had asked for even more intensive 
recruitment in the colonies, became known as the "butcher". At the end of April he was 
relieved of his command. 
From then onwards an ever-growing number of people claimed that the soldier reservoir in 
the colonies had been depleted. In September 1917, the Governor-General of French West 
Africa, Joost Van Vollenhoven, ordered a temporary recruitment stop. Van Vollenhoven put 
forward two arguments against further recruitments. First, he stressed the priority of the 
economic usefulness of French West Africa above its military usefulness. Second, he stressed 
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the resistance to recruitments. In the public discussion in the mother country, however, the 
deployment of colonial troops in Europe was allocated a significance that was fundamental 
for the French colonial empire. The loyal involvement of the colonial peoples in the world 
war was, it was claimed, evidence of the advanced stage of the civilization process, and 
proved that the colonial peoples had understood that their interests were identical to those of 
France. At the same time the common war experience was ascribed an assimilating effect.  
In fact, recruitment in the overseas territories presented enormous problems. The authorities 
in West Africa were faced with countless forms of opposition, ranging from incidental cases 
of self-mutilation and fleeing into the bush or to Liberia, Gambia, Portuguese Guinea and to 
the Ivory Coast, to armed rebellions against the colonial administration. A revolt in 
Bélédougou in 1915 undoubtedly opposed recruitment; during the great revolt in West Volta 
in 1915-1916 and numerous rebellions in the north of Dahomey between 1916 and 1917 
recruitment was at the very least a major trigger. In Algeria also all kinds of opposition were 
witnessed. Back in the autumn of 1914 the persons concerned and their families had held 
protest actions against conscriptions in various locations. Resistance to recruitments 
culminated in the winter of 1916-1917 in a major uprising in the South Constantinois. In 
Tunisia there were a few minor revolts in 1915 and 1916. 
However, in spite of this in January 1918, the French government again raised the issue of 
recruiting more troops in Africa. Prime Minister Clemenceau was found willing to recruit  
200,000 mercenaries in Ethiopia, but he received little support from President Poincaré. 
Clemenceau had more success with his demand to have both French West Africa and Algeria 
send 50,000 men to the Western Front. The government entrusted the organisation of the 
recruitment in West Africa to the Senegalese delegate Blaise Diagne. In September Diagne 
was able to confirm the recruitment of 77,000 soldiers to Paris; this exceeded expectations by 
far. The end of the war spared these soldiers from actually having to fight at the front. 
However, as from 1919 many of them were stationed as occupation soldiers in Rhineland 
where many became sick or died. 
In Great Britain also the issue of the colonial troops was a frequent subject of discussion. 
Already on 5 August 1914, one day after Britain had declared war on Germany, the war 
council presided by Prime Minister Asquith decided to send an Indian division to Egypt and 
to keep a cavalry brigade plus an extra division on stand by for deployment overseas. Three 
weeks later, on 28 August, the government decided to move these units to Marseille. This 
decision was unanimously approved by both parliament and the press. Many writers of 
readers’ letters also applauded the deployment of Indian troops in Europe. In September the 
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then Indian Viceroy Lord Curzon articulated the vision of one day marching into conquered 
Germany with Indian troops. Shortly later in a speech at the "Indian Empire Club" in London 
he described the arrival of the Indians as “a dramatic moment in the history of the Indian 
Empire", yes, even as "a landmark in our connection with India".  
On 26 September 1914, the first Indian soldiers stepped onto French soil. In the following 
weeks the interest for the Indian troops reached a climax. The Indians were cheered up with 
letters from the mother country and their first deployments in the war were extensively 
praised in the press. A fund set up in October for Indian war invalids and their relatives was 
flooded with gifts. In November some Indian soldiers even escorted King George V to the 
state opening of parliament. 
In the course of 1915, the Indians gradually disappeared from front page news. When in 
December 1915 most of the Indian troops were withdrawn from the European war, the press 
merely printed the royal message with almost no comment. The attention of the British was 
increasingly focusing on the Africans. As opposed to France, Great Britain had already sent 
African troops to the non-European theatres of war, but not yet on the Western Front. 
During the year 1916, a "Black Army" lobby was formed, mainly supported by people with a 
colonial background. In May 1916 Winston Churchill demanded in the House of Commons 
that African units and ten to twelve Indian divisions be trained for deployment in Europe. 
Churchill motivated his proposal as follows: "Let us [...] think what historians of the future 
would write if they were writing a history of the present time and had to record that Great 
Britain was forced to make an inconclusive peace because she forgot Africa; that at a time 
when every man counted [...] the Government of Great Britain was unable to make any use of 
a mighty continent. [...] It would be incredible; but it is taking place. [...] What is going on 
while we sit here, while we go away to dinner, or home to bed? Nearly 1.000 men – 
Englishmen, Britishers, men of our own race – are knocked into bundles of bloody rags every 
twenty-four hours. [...] Every measure must be considered, and none put aside while there is 
hope of obtaining something from it." 
In October of that same year Major Stuart–Stephens published an article entitled “Our Million 
Black Army!” in the "English Review". In it he called for the depletion of the reservoir of 
"black fighting material" in Africa and the deployment of half a million of "big, lusty, coal-
black devils" on the Western Front, just like the French, in whose army "thousands of fanatic 
Moors" had fought. In line with the Europeans and North Americans the British also imagined 
a  hierarchy of “race” in which the “whites” were situated at the top of humanity, the “blacks” 
right at the bottom and with the Indians somewhere in between.  
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Within this vertical division there was a further horizontal division for the peoples colonized 
under the “whites”, which played a central role in the issue of colonial troops, namely the 
distinction between “belligerent” and “non-belligerent” races. When recruiting their Indian 
troops the British had always mainly based their selection on the so-called "martial races" to 
whom a natural, partly climatic and partly genetic predisposition for war had been ascribed. 
Virtually the same properties of the Indian "martial races" were also ascribed to the New 
Zealand Maori fighters. Thus, for instance the London "Times" described the embarkation of 
a Maori contingent for Europe in April 1915 in the following words: “The Maoris were 
magnificent fighters in their natural state, and that they have not all been ruined in physique 
by a generation of peace was conclusively shown by a glance at their men on parade." 
Now the propagandists of the "Million Black Army Movements" argued that “martial races” 
could not only be found in India and New Zealand but also in the African colonies. Major 
Stuart–Stephens described the peoples of Southern Africa in the following words: "There 
seems to be something in the disposition and genius of the common stock from which they 
come, some hereditary bias in their brain, in their very blood, which fits the Zulus and 
Basutos for the easy acquisition of the fighting trade." The sole condition for making this 
"first-rate fighting material" usable according to Stuart–Stephens, was to place them under the 
strict leadership by white officers familiar with the nature of the blacks. 
The objectives of the "Black Army" lobby were met with protest from various sides: military, 
colonial authorities, representatives of the Left parties and the South African colonists 
opposed the plans to allow African troops to fight in Europe. The arguments of the opponents 
originated from three groups, namely the humanitarians, who believed the use of Africans in 
Europe was inhuman, the imperialists, who feared revolts of veterans in the colonies in the 
post-war period if Africans were trained on a large scale and those with a military and 
political inclination, who questioned the military value of West African troops in a European 
war. 
Of the Left opponents of the "Black Army" concept Edmund Dené Morel deserves a mention, 
because at the beginning of the century he had acquired an international reputation for 
exposing the exploitation practices in the Belgian Congo. In August 1914, Morel set up the 
"Union of Democratic Control", that aimed for parliamentary control of British foreign 
policies and a peace treaty based on compromises. He subsequently called for the 
neutralization of Africa in a number of publications. He described the recruitment of Africans 
for military service as a crime of Europe against Africa. He also highlighted the possible 
negative impact on the colonial system. After the war Morel launched a campaign against the 
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"Black Horror on the Rhine", the stationing of colonial occupation troops in the Rhineland. 
Also prominent members of the "Fabian Society" such as H. G. Wells and Bernard Shaw 
critized the deployment of black African troops in Europe. 
However, a more important aspect was the opposition from Africa itself. All the governors of 
the British Colonies and East and West Africa rejected the recruitment of troops for 
deployment in Europe barring one exception. The fear of a black revolution prevailed in 
South Africa also. The Boer newspaper, "Ons Land", wrote shortly after the outbreak of war: 
"The deployment of Arabian, Indian and African troops on the European battlefields brings 
East and West, whites and blacks in close contact with one another. We cannot but wonder 
what the consequences of this will be. Senior citizens, women and children of the enemy will 
fall into the hands of these black and yellow auxiliary troops. […] This can only be 
detrimental to the image of Western culture and of the whites." In May 1917, in a speech to 
the war cabinet in London, South African delegate General Smuts, spoke of the dangers to the 
colonial system and to European civilization in general if black Africans were given arms on a 
large scale. 
The British Ministry of Colonial Affairs also opposed the notion of a "Million Black Army 
Movement". At the end of 1916, under pressure of public opinion, the Ministry of War and 
Parliament agreed to send a recruitment mission to West Africa, but it was far from unhappy 
when it did not meet the expected success. At an interdepartmental conference in May 1918 it 
was decided to set up a West African brigade for possible deployment in Saloniki, Palestine, 
Egypt, Mesopotamia or Africa, "but not against the Germans in Europe". In September 1918,  
the British High Commander on the Western Front recommended they should follow the 
French example for the offensives scheduled for 1919 and bring "contingents of black troops 
for incorporation in the British Divisions" to Europe. The War Cabinet declined this request at 
the suggestion of the Ministry of Colonial Affairs. 
The colonial troops among the opponents also soon became a standard theme of German war 
publicity. In July 1915, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs circulated a memorandum entitled 
"Illegitimate use of coloured troops in the European theatres of war by England and France", 
in which African and Indian soldiers were accused of all sorts of atrocities, like poking out 
eyes and cutting of ears or whole heads of captured or wounded German soldiers. That same 
year the brochure "The coloured auxiliary peoples of the English and French" was published 
by the lawyer Hans Belius, who aimed to prove that using "savages" against "civilised 
people" was prohibited by international law. Even the liberal sociologist Max Weber 
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complained that "an army of niggers, Ghurkhas and all the barbarians of the world” were at 
Germany’s borders.  
German propaganda qualified the colonial troops with all possible contemptuous concepts 
suggesting that they were not regular unit. The pallet ranged from a "human medley of 
colours and religions", "diabolical", "dehumanized savages", "dead scum of the wilderness", 
"Africans slaughtering in diabolical ecstasy", "auxiliary troop scum of all colours" and "apes" 
and expressions like "African exhibition" or "popular show of non or insufficiently civilised 
gangs and hordes", which was a contemptuous reference to the custom that prevailed right up 
to the interbellum period of exhibiting relatives of non-European peoples in zoos, in specially 
constructed "aboriginal villages" and in variety shows, to "black flood" and "dark mud" to 
"black shame", a slogan that had a remarkable career in the twenties. Furthermore, the 
German propagandists ventured into apocalyptic predictions that the colonial peoples would 
loose their respect for white people because of their deployment in Europe, and that this 
would eventually lead to the end of European hegemony in Africa and Asia or even to the fall 
of the entire "white race".  
But how did the German soldiers consider the colonial troops? Statements in forces’ letters 
and diaries like "you can’t really consider a nigger [...] as a comrade" or the description of 
colonial troops as "scum" and "circus" bear witness to their contempt as illegitimate 
opponents. The stories of atrocities circulated by the propaganda apparently also reached the 
front, which did nothing to improve the morale of the troops. Thus, it was generally believed 
the Africans took no prisoners and when German units captured a new front sector the 
question was often anxiously put as to whether there were any black soldiers among the 
opponents. In his memoirs Senegalese Bakary Diallo described the capture of a German 
soldier, whose whole body started shaking with fear when he was suddenly surrounded by 
Africans. And a German army report of 1918 stated that a column “quickly abandoned the 
front line without a shot having been fired and without the enemy appearing at the cry of ‘The  
French are attacking, the blacks are coming’" .  
The intensive discussions about colonial troops continued after the war with regard to the 
stationing of African and Asian soldiers in the French occupation zone on the Rhine.  The 
focus was on the so-called sexual offences against the civilian population of the Rhineland 
which aroused international attention particularly between 1920 and 1923 during a 
propaganda campaign with the slogans "black abuse" and "black shame”. 
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